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December 1989 Abstract 
We analyze the interest rate and savings effects of fiscal policy in 
an overlapping generations framework that accommodates two observations: (1) 
the interest rate on  consumption loans exceeds the rate of return to household 
savings;  and  (2)  private intergenerational transfers are widespread and 
primarily occur early in the life cycle of recipients.  The wedge between 
borrowing and lending rates in our model arises from the asymmetric tax 
treatment of interest income and interest payments.  Intergenerational 
transfers in our model are altruistically motivated.  We prove the invariance 
of capital's steady-state  marginal product to government expenditures, 
government debt, the labor income-tax schedules,  and the tax rate on capital 
income when borrowing rates exceed lending rates and at least some families 
are altruistically connected. In contrast,  under the same conditions we find 
that the tax treatment of interest payments has powerful effects on capital's 
marginal product. 1.  Introduction 
The interest rate on consumption loans greatly exceeds the rate of  return to household 
savings.  As  documented in table 1, during selected years over the past two decades the 
after-tax nominal  interest rate on  unsecured personal loans averaged 12.4  percent  per 
year, while the after-tax nominal rate of  return on government securities averaged only 6.5 
percent. The after-tax wedge between household borrowing and lending rates averaged 5.7 
percentage points. This wedge increases to a full 8 percentage points if  we  use the credit- 
card rate as the measure of household borrowing rates. A wedge of  6 to 8 percentage points 
is too large to explain away by a simple adjustment for positive default rates on unsecured 
consumer loans.  Thus, households face a kink in their intertemporal budget constraint. 
We  take this simple empirical observation as one stepping-off point for our analysis of  how 
tax and debt policy affect aggregate savings and interest rates. 
We  develop our analysis in the context of  an overlapping generations framework that 
encompasses a wedge between borrowing and lending rates.  We  model the source of  this 
wedge as the asymmetric tax treatment of  interest income and interest payments on con- 
sumption loans. We focus on this source of  the wedge for three reasons: (i) this component 
of  the wedge can be directly manipulated by tax policy; (ii) as the positive entries in row 
(9) of  table 1 indicate, asymmetries in the tax code make the wedge larger; and (iii) many 
past and proposed reforms of  the U.S.  tax code imply nontrivial changes in the wedge. 
As  an example of  tax policy's  impact on the size of  the wedge between borrowing 
and lending rates, consider the Tax Reform Act of  1986.  Comparing the 1984 and post- 
reform entries in table 1 indicates that a direct effect of  the Tax Reform Act is to increase 
the size of  the wedge by 3 percentage p0ints.l  While tax code asymmetries contribute to 
the wedge between borrowing and lending rates, table 1 also indicates that other features 
of  the economy  account for the bulk of  the wedge.  In this connection, we  remark that 
our framework accommodates (with minor modifications) any capital-market imperfection 
that amounts to a proportional transactions cost in the consumption-loans market. 
 h he figures in row (5) of table 1 are not adjusted for provisions in the tax code governing 
tax-sheltered savings. Since the Tax Reform Act of  1986 greatly restricted the availability 
of  IRAs, table 1 understates the Act's  impact on the wedge.  Our attempts to adjust the 
measure of  p for IRAs suggest that the 1986 Act increased the average after-tax wedge by 
more than 3.5 percentage points. TABLE 1 
Notes:  a. Source:  Federal Reserve Bulletin,  various issues. 
b.  Values for 1970, 1972, 1980, 1983, and 1984 were calculated  by  the authors.  The Poet  1986  Tax 
Reform rate is based on the fully phased-in provisions of  the Tax Reform Act of  1986. See Footnote 6. 
c.  Source:  Federd Reserve Bulletin, various issues. 
d. Values for 1970, 1972, and 1980 were taken from Estrella and Fuhrer (1983). We  calculated the values 
for 1983 and 1984 using this same procedure.  The post-Tax Reform value was taken from Hausman and 
Poterba (1987). 
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of  intergenerational transfers. Based on a representative cross-section of U.S.  households, 
Cox and Raines (1985) report high incidence rates for the receipt of private transfers over 
the first eight months of  1979, especially among family units headed by  a  person  less 
than 25  years old.  Cox and Raines also provide evidence that most private transfers are 
intergenerational, that the overwhelming bulk of  intergenerational transfers are from older 
to younger generations, and that most intergenerational transfers occur inter vivos, Using 
the same data set as Cox and Raines, Kurz (1984) estimates that private intergenerational 
transfers amounted to $63 billion in 1979, excluding  inheritance^.^ 
We  do not integrate a full range of  transfer motives into our analytical framework. 
Instead, we focus on intergenerational altruism as a transfer motive and explore its impli- 
cations in economies with a wedge between borrowing and lending rates.  We  believe that 
a complete explanation for the magnitude and prevalence of  intergenerational transfers is 
likely to involve an important role for intergenerational altruism.  In any case, several of 
our chief results require only that altruism motivates some intergenerational transfers, not 
that it motivates all or even most intergenerational transfers. 
Our results provide answers to  four questions. First, how does the existence of a wedge 
between borrowing and lending rates affect the life-cycle timing of altruistically motivated 
intergenerational transfers? Second, in economies that contain a wedge in the loan market 
and at least some altruistic family lines, what are the long-run effects of  government debt, 
unfunded social security, and labor income taxation on aggregate savings and capital's 
marginal product? Third, how do tax policy changes that alter the size of  the wedge affect 
aggregate savings and capital's marginal product?  Fourth, what does the existence of a 
wedge between borrowing and lending rates imply about the relationship of  overlapping 
generations models with altruistic family lines to models with infinitely lived representative 
20ther  empirical approaches bear out the importance of  intergenerational transfers. Kot- 
likoff and Summers (1981) construct age-earnings and age-consumption profiles to compute 
life-cycle wealth (savings for retirement) for various age cohorts in the United States. By 
comparing their computation for life-cycle wealth to aggregate wealth, they conclude that 
intergenerational transfers account for the bulk of  aggregate savings.  See also Kotlikoff 
(1988) and Modigliani (1988).  Our analysis does not address the aggregate savings puz- 
zle identified by  these studies.  As  we  show  in the following discussion, intergenerational 
transfers in our framework occur inter vivos and are used to finance consumption. agents? 
With respect to the first question, the existence of  a wedge between borrowing and 
lending rates pins down the optimal timing of  intergenerational transfers.  Altruistically 
motivated intergenerational transfers occur early in the life cycle, when borrowing rates 
exceed lending rates.  This timing result implies that the wedge destroys the fully inter- 
connected set of  budget constraints that undergirds standard Ricardian neutrality results.  -. 
We  show, for example, that an increase in the scale of  an unfunded social security program 
causes a short-run reduction in aggregate savings.  This outcome occurs in  a model in 
which each generation is linked to its succeeding generation by altruistic transfers early in 
the life cycle. 
With respect to the second question, we  derive a powerful long-run neutrality result 
relating changes in government expenditures, government debt, the scale of social security 
programs, and the labor  income tax schedule to capital's  marginal product:  If  at least 
some family lines are characterized by  (a)  an operative transfer motive and (b) young 
persons who are at an interior solution with respect  to their borrowing or saving deci- 
sion, then capital's steady-state marginal product is invariant to each of  these government 
intervent  ions. 
Unlike neutrality results in the tradition of  Barro (1974), Becker (1974), and Bernheim 
and Bagwell  (1988), the proof of  our neutrality result does not rest upon a network of 
interconnected budget constraints. Thus, our neutrality result is both far more robust and 
far less comprehensive than the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem.  Our result applies to a 
wider class of  interventions, it does not require perfect capital markets, and it does not 
rest upon pervasive intergenerational altruism.  It is less comprehensive in the sense that 
it applies only to the steady-state marginal product of  capital. 
With respect to tax policy interventions that affect  the size of  the wedge, we show 
the following.  First, if  conditions (a) and (b) hold for at least some family lines, and if 
the household borrowing rate exceeds the rate of  return to saving (as in table I),  then 
changes in the proportional tax rate on capital income have no long-run effect on capi- 
tal's marginal product.  It follows that for a plausible elasticity of  aggregate labor supply, 
aggregate savings is highly inelastic with respect to changes in the tax rate on capital 
income. Second, under the same conditions, capital's long-run marginal product is highly sensitive to changes in the proportional subsidy rate on household borrowing.  It follows 
that aggregate savings is highly elastic with respect  to changes in  the subsidy rate on 
household borrowing, regardless of  whether the labor supply is elastic.  Thus, our anal- 
ysis indicates that the subsidy to household borrowing is a much more potent tool for 
influencing aggregate savings than is the tax rate on capital income. 
Finally, with respect to the fourth question, our analysis highlights the sharp distinc- 
tions between overlapping generations models with altruistic linkages and representative 
agent models.  Since even a small wedge between borrowing and lending rates pins down 
the optimal timing of  inter  generational transfers, altruistic linkage models are generally 
not  isomorphic to representative agent models.  The distinct fiscal policy implications of 
these two models, and the life-cycle model, emerge clearly in some numerical simulations 
reported in section 6.  The simulations focus on the long-run response of aggregate savings 
to changes in the tax rate on capital income and changes in the subsidy rate on interest 
payments. 
We  turn now to a description of  our analytical framework. 
2. An  Overlapping Generations Framework with Capital Income Taxat ion 
Consider an overlapping generations production economy populated by  persons who 
live for three periods.  Each member of generation t supplies homogeneous labor services 
(Lit, Lzt,  L3t) over the life cycle according to a lifetime productivity  (al,  a2,  a3) 
and a labor-leisure choice spelled out below.  Aggregate period-t labor supply is given by 
where n is the population growth rate, and we have normalized population so that gener- 
ation 0 has one member. 
Defining k = 5 as the capital-labor ratio, we write the aggregate production function 
as 
yt = F[K~,  (1 + n)'~t]  = (1  + n)'~tf  (kt),  (2) 
where f I(-)  > 0, f "(a) < 0, limk-o  f (k) =  00, and limk-rn  f '(k) = 0.  The representative 
firm's competitive profit-maximization conditions are and 
where Wt is the period-t wage in units of  the produced good and rt is the rate of return 
on physical capital held from time t -  1 to time t. 
The representative member of generation t chooses a sequence over consumption, labor 
supply, and intergenerational transfers to maximize 
where 
Cit = consumption by a member of  generation t in the ith period of  life; 
Lit = labor supply by a member of  generation t in the ith period of  life; 
/3  = intertemporal discount factor, 0 < P < 1; 
7 = interpersonal discount factor, 0 < 7 5 (1 + n)/P (insures a positive steady-state 
interest rate when transfer motives operate and capital markets are perfect); 
u(-) = period utility function (over consumption), satisfying ut(-) > 0, utt(.) < 0, 
limc,o  ut(C) = oo, and lime,,  ut(C) = 0; 
v(.) = period utility function (over labor supply), satisfying vl(-) < 0, vt'(-) < 0, 
limL,ovt(L)  = 0, and limL,Zvt(L)  = -00,  where Z  is  a positive upper  bound on 
labor supply; and 
U,*+,  = maximum utility  attainable by a generation t + 1 agent  as a function  of 
intergenerational transfers received. 
The specification of  altruistic preferences in equation (5) mirrors the specification in 
Barro (1974) and many other analyses.  We  allow for operative and inoperative transfer 
motives, so that equation (5) also encompasses pure life-cycle economies. 
Turning to the household budget constraints, we consider lifetime productivity pro- 
files such that the middle-aged individuals choose to save and the young individuals choose 
to save or borrow.  A key feature of  our model is a wedge between household borrowing 
and lending rates.  We  explicitly model the source of  this wedge  as distortionary tax- 
ation of  interest income that is not  (fully) matched by  the subsidy applied to interest 
payments on consumption loans.  Alternatively, we  could interpret the wedge as arising from any capital-market imperfection that amounts to a proportional transaction cost in 
the consumption-loans market.  Although we focus on the tax interpretation of the wedge 
between borrowing and lending rates, our results apply with little or no modification when 
proportional transaction costs exist in the loan market. 
It is worthwhile to observe that, for a sufficiently large wedge between borrowing and 
savings rates, young households may choose a corner position at which they neither save 
nor borrow.  A wedge economy with a corner outcome is (locally) equivalent to an econ- 
omy with binding borrowing constraints that stem from the absence of  ex post enforcement 
mechanisms in the consumption-loans market, or any other capital-market  imperfection 
severe enough to shut down the consumption-loans market. Thus, our overlapping genera- 
tions framework encompasses capital-market imperfections that take the form of  borrowing 
constraints.  In this paper, we  focus primarily on equilibria in which the young are at an 
interior solution with respect to either their savings or their borrowing decision.  How- 
ever, corner outcomes arise in some of  our numerical simulation exercises.  For a complete 
analysis of  corner equilibria, see Altig and Davis (1989a,b). 
With these remarks in mind, we write the budget equations for a representative mem- 
ber of  generation t as 
Clt +  Ult  + Tlt = &lLltWt + blt + xt,  (6) 
where 
xt = borrowings by generation t when young; 
alt = savings (claims to capital) by generation t when young; 
a2t =  savings (in the form of  claims to capital or repayment of  consumption loans) by 
generation t when middle-aged; 
bi,t+l = transfers made by  a generation-t parent to each (1 + n) offspring in  the 
children's ith period of  life (an inter vivos transfer for i = 1,2, a bequest for i =  3); 
Tit = lumpsum taxes (subsidies if negative) levied on a member of generation t during 
the ith period of  life; dt+l = government debt issued at time t + 1 per middle-aged person; 
rt = the pre-tax rate of  return from t -  1 to t on claims to physical capital, government 
debt, and the repayment of  consumption loans; 
4t = 1 + rt(l -  p) where p = proportional tax rate on interest income; and 
t,bt  = 1  +rt (1 -  6)  where 6 = the proportional subsidy rate applied to interest payments 
on consumption loans. 
For simplicity, and without loss, the budget constraints incorporate the assumption that 
all government debt is purchased by the middle-aged. 
The  representative consumer maximizes equation (5) subject to equations (6)-(8) and 
the non-negativity constraints on period consumption, labor supply and transfers. Assum- 
ing nonpositive savings by the young (alt  = O),  the consumer's intertemporal first-order 
conditions can be written 
Equation (9)  holds as an equality when the loan market is active; it holds as an inequality 
when the loan market is inactive and when the young are at a corner. 
Using the envelope  theorem,  the first-order conditions governing intergenerational 
transfers are 
r 
ut(C2t)  t  rr;;ut(Cl,t+~)  with equality if bl,t+1 > 0,  (11) 
.I 
ut(C3t)  2 TT;E~t(C2,t+l)  with equality if  b2,t+l > 0, 
for inter vivos transfers and 
rP 
ut(C3t)  2  +  rt+2(1- p))ut(C3,t+l) with equality if  b3,t+l > 0  (13) 
for bequests.  Equations  (11) and (12) state that, when an inter vivos transfer motive 
operates,  the discounted marginal rate of  substitution of  parents'  consumption for chil- 
dren's consumption equals the (population growth) deflated interpersonal discount factor. 
Equation (13) has a similar interpretation. The static first-order conditions characterizing the labor-leisure trade-off for a member 
of  generation t are given by 
vt(Lit) = -aiWt+i-l~'(Cit),  for  i=1,2,3.  (14) 
To complete the framework, we specify the government budget constraint, the goods- 
market-clearing condition, and the capital-market- clearing condition: 
C2,t-1  C3,t-2 
(1  + n)Lt+lkt+l -  Ltkt + Clt + l+n  +  + St = Ltf  (kt),  (16)  (1  + n)2 
where 
gt =  government expenditures on goods and services at time t per middle-aged person, 
rlt = Tlt, 
r2,t-1  = T~,~-~  -  brt~t-l  + ~r~a~,~-~,  and 
r3,t-2 = T3,t-2  +  prt(a2,t-2 +  b3,t-2  +  dt-1). 
We  assume that, on the margin, government expenditures are unproductive and do not 
substitute for private consumption.  For our purposes, nothing essential is altered by  re- 
laxing these assumptions. 
For economies that fit within this framework, an equilibrium is a sequence 
{Clt, C2,t-1, C3,t-2, Llt, L2,t-1, L3,t-2,  xt, alt,  a2,t-1, bit, b2,t-1,  b3,t-2,  Wt, rt+1, kt, gt, dt, 
TIt  ,  T2,+1, T3,t-2)z0 that satisfies equations (3) through  (14), the non-negativity con- 
straints, the market-clearing conditions, and the government budget constraint for all t, 
given the initial condition (x-~,  a1,-1,  a2,-a, ko,  do). 
3. The Optimal Timing of Altruistic Intergenerational Transfers 
In  Barro's (1974) Ricardian environment, the optimal timing of  altruistic intergener- 
ational transfers is indeterminate. Since capital markets are perfect, children and parents 
care only about the present value of  intergenerational transfers, and not about their exact 
timing. This timing indeterminacy supports an extensive set of  intergenerational linkages, 
which in turn play a key role in neutralizing certain fiscal policies.  A straightforward, but central, result that emerges from our framework is the knife-edge character of  this timing 
indeterminacy. 
The slightest friction in the consumption-loans market in the form of  a wedge between 
borrowing and lending rates-or a strong friction like binding borrowing constraints-pins 
down the optimal timing of  altruistically motivated intergenerational transfers.  Once the 
timing of  intergenerational transfers is pinned down, the extensive set of intergenerational 
linkages in  Ricardian environments breaks down.  Despite this general observation, the 
fiscal policy  implications of  pinning down  the timing of  intergenerational  transfers de- 
pend very much on whether capital-market imperfections drive potential borrowers to a 
corner solution, whether capital-market imperfections arise from transaction costs or tax 
considerations, and on the elasticity of  labor supply. 
We  now state two proposit  ions that characterize the optimal timing of  altruistically 
motivated transfers.  The first proposition applies when borrowing rates exceed lending 
rates in an active consumption-loans market or when the wedge between borrowing and 
lending rates is large enough to drive young persons to a corner with  respect to their 
borrowing decision. The second proposition applies when lending rates exceed borrowing 
rates. 
Proposition 1: Assume that borrowing rates exceed lending rates (p  > 6)  in the 
consumption-loans market and that the non-negativity constraint binds on a1 . Then, if 
intergenerational transfers are positive, bl > 0 and b2 = b3 = 0. 
Proof: 
Interior solution for x: 
Suppose that b2 > 0,  so that equation (12)  holds with equality. Combining equations 
(12) and (10)  yields 
Substituting into equation (9) yields 
Equation  (11) requires that ut(C1)  < (?)ut(c2).  This condition holds if and only if which implies 6 2 p, violating the hypothesis (a). Thus, b2 cannot be positive. 
Now suppose that b3 > 0.  Then equation (13) leads to (18), and we obtain a contra- 
diction in the same way as before. Thus, b3 cannot be positive. 
Finally, when bl > 0,  equations (9) and (11) imply 
It is straightforward to verify that equations (12) and (13) are consistent with (19) when 
b2 = b3 = 0. Thus, if intergenerational transfers are positive, only bl > 0. 
Corner solution for x: 
As before, suppose that b2 > 0 or bg > 0.  Then equation (12) or (13) in combination 
with equations (9) and (10) yield 
Substituting this expression into equation (11) yields a contradiction.  Thus, b2 = b3 = 0. 
Furthermore, bl > 0 is consistent with equations (9) through (13). 
Following the same line of  argument as in the preceding proof, we have 
Proposition 2: Assume that lending rates exceed borrowing rates in the consumption loans 
market and that the non-negativity constraint binds on  al.  Then, if  intergenerational 
transfers are positive, bZ > 0 or bg > 0, or both, and bl = 0. 
The intuition behind these timing propositions is straightforward.  Parents choose the 
timing of intergenerational transfers to exploit the wedge between the after-tax borrowing 
rate faced by the child and the after-tax rate of  return on their own savings. More generally, 
in the cases covered by  Proposition 1 (2), the marginal rate of  substitution of  current for 
future consumption is higher (lower) for children than for parents.  Thus, transfers early 
(late) in the life cycle dominate transfers late (early) in the life cycle.  As  we show in the 
following section, this timing result has important implications for fiscal policy. 4.  Lump-Sum Fiscal Policy in the Altruistic Linkage Model 
We  turn now  to the analysis of  lumpsum fiscal policy in economies with altruistic 
family lines and  a wedge between borrowing and lending rates.  We  prove two results 
under the assumption of  an active loan market.  First, all lump-sum social security and 
government debt interventions are fully neutral in their effect on steady-state equilibrium. 
Second, we show by way of  a simple example that these same fiscal policies are typically 
non-neutral in their short-run impact. 
A. Long-Run Neutrality 
Proposition  9:  If  (a) the consumption-loans market is  active, (b) the altruistic transfer 
motive operates, and (c) the level of  government expenditures is constant, then all fiscal 
policies that redistribute resources between generations in a lump-sum manner have no ef- 
fect on steady-state values of  interest rates, the capital stock, and the lifetime consumption 
profile. 
Proof: 
Case (i):  p > 6: 
By hypothesis (a), 
u'(C1) =  [1 + r (1 -  6)]  u1(c2). 
By hypothesis (b), p > 6, and applying proposition 1, 
Combining these two equations yields equation (19). The parameters on the right side of 
equation (19) are independent of  lumpsum fiscal policies. Thus, the capital-labor ratio is 
also independent of  lump-sum fiscal policies. 
Use the first-order conditions (9) and (10) to rewrite the goods-market-clearing con- 
dition as 
G(C2  ,  k, 6, P) = L [f (k) -  nk] -  g, 
where  > 0.  By condition (19), the term in square brackets is a constant. 
Now suppose that the capital stock rises following the fiscal intervention.  k  and g 
constant imply that L rises, which implies that C2 rises.  But an increase in C2 implies that L falls by equation  (14), a contradiction.  We  also obtain a contradiction when we 
suppose the capital stock falls. Thus, the capital stock does not change. 
It follows that L, W, and aggregate consumption are also unchanged.  Finally, since 
aggregate consumption and the interest rates are unchanged, it follows from equations (9) 
and (10) that the lifetime consumption profile is unchanged. 
Case  (ii),  p <  6: 
The proof proceeds along lines parallel to case (i). Note that the steady-state interest 
rate is now given by equation (18). 
The main distinguishing feature of  proposition 3 is the line of  proof. To develop this 
point, consider the nature of  the neutrality results that appear in the literature.  Fiscal- 
policy neutrality results in the tradition of  Barro (1974), Becker (1974), and Bernheim and 
Bagwell (1988) exploit the interconnectedness of  budget constraints implied by operative 
altruistic transfers.  (Bernheim and Bagwell refer  to the interconnectedness of  budget 
constraints as the linkage hypothesis.)  Neutrality theorems in this tradition basically state 
that a government-imposed transfer between two persons or generations who are directly or 
indirectly linked by altruistic transfers (before and after the government action) is neutral 
in its impact on consumption patterns and prices. 
In contrast,  the proof  of  proposition 3 does  not exploit the interconnectedness of 
budget constraints implied by  operative altruistic transfer motives.  Instead, the proof 
combines an intertemporal first-order condition with the first-order condition governing 
altruistic transfers to pin down the interest rate in terms of  preference, growth rate, and 
tax parameters. The remainder of  the proof then follows from the intertemporal first-order 
conditions and the goods-market-clearing condition. Thus, our proof exploits the implica- 
tions of  altruistic preferences for the transfer motive first-order condition, whereas proofs in 
the Barro/Becker/Bernheim-Bagwell  tradition exploit the implications of  altruistic pref- 
erences for the interconnectedness of  budget constraints.  As  we  show in the following 
section,  this aspect of  our proof carries powerful implications for  the interest  rate and 
savings response to distortionary tax policy interventions as well. 
The substance of  proposition 3 differs in two respects from the Ricardian Equivalence 
Theorem as proved by  Barro (1974) and as reformulated many times in the subsequent literature.  First, the neutrality result in proposition 3 holds despite distortionary capital 
income taxation and, more generally, despite the asymmetric tax treatment of  interest 
income and interest payments on consumption loans.  Second, proposition 3 applies only 
to the steady-state effects of  debt and social security interventions.  When borrowing and 
lending rates differ (p # 6), lump-sum interventions typically imply non-neutralities along 
the transition path. 
We  now demonstrate that a wedge between borrowing and lending rates implies the 
short-run non-neutrality of  lumpsum fiscal policies in the altruistic linkage model.  Our 
discussion focuses on the impact effects of  a surprise increase in lump-sum payments to 
older individuals, financed by  an increase in lumpsum taxes on middle-aged individuals. 
Thus,  the experiment  represents  a surprise increase in the size of  an  unfunded social 
security system. 
To  make the argument transparent,  we  adopt several simplifying assumptions:  no 
population growth, inelastic labor supply, no labor supply by  the old, no government ex- 
penditures, and the redistribution of  all distortionary taxes to the affected generations via 
lump-sum transfers.  We  further assume that the economy is in a steady-state equilibrium 
at time t, prior to the intervention at time t + 1. 
Let T2t denote the additional lumpsum tax levied on middle-aged persons at time 
t + 1.  Normalizing so that a1 + a2 = 1, write the goods-market-clearing condition as 
Given p > 6, proposition 1 informs us that the marginal utility of  consumption of  the 
older generation exceeds the y-discounted marginal utility of  their middle-aged children's 
consumption.  Hence, individuals who are old at time t + 1 will choose to increase C3,t-1 
by  the full amount of  a small, surprise increase in social security payments.  This is the 
key observation. 
Now  use the budget constraint (8) and the government budget constraint to rewrite 
the goods-market-clearing condition as Except for T2t,  every term on the left side of  equation (20) is predetermined.  It follows 
from the key observation in the preceding paragraph that the social security payment to 
the old translates dollar-for-dollar as reductions in the sum of  consumption by the young, 
consumption by the middle-aged, and aggregate savings. The impact effect is non-neutral. 
Consumption-smoothing incentives (both between persons and over time) imply that 
part of the decline takes the form of  a reduction in aggregate savings.  Thus, the capital 
stock falls and the interest rate rises. Since equation (9) holds with equality, consumption 
falls for both the young and the middle-aged.  If  we  allow for  an elastic labor supply, 
the impact effects also include increased aggregate output and a reduction in the wage. 
Because the middle-aged reduce savings by  more if  they anticipate higher future social 
security benefits, the impact effects on the capital stock are smaller for a transitory increase 
in old-age benefits than for an increase expected to persist for two or more periods.  By 
the same token, the impact effects on labor supply, output, the wage, and consumption by 
the middle-aged and the young are larger in response to a transitory increase in old-age 
benefits. 
These remarks show that altruistic linkage models lead to short-run  non-neutrality 
and long-run neutrality in response to small lumpsum interventions. The wedge between 
borrowing and lending rates is essential for this dichotomy between long-run and short-run 
responses. If  borrowing rates equal lending rates in a model with homogenous family lines 
and altruistic intergenerational transfers, then adjacent generations are connected at the 
margin by intergenerational transfers at all stages of  the life cycle.  In this case, arguments 
based on the interconnectedness of budget constraints apply, and full neutrality prevails. 
5.  Long-Run Interest-Rate Neutrality in the Altruistic Linkage Model 
We  now turn our attention to the long-run effects of  the tax policy parameters, p and 
6, on interest rates and aggregate savings in the altruistic linkage model.  We  first build 
on the analysis in section 4 to obtain a strong neutrality result.  We  then show that the 
proportional subsidy rate on interest payments has powerful effects on aggregate savings 
when borrowing rates exceed lending rates. 
A. Interest-Rate Neutrality 
14 Consider a version of  the altruistic linkage model in which borrowing rates exceed 
lending rates in an active consumption-loans market. Retracing the first part of  the proof 
to proposition 3 yields equation (19), reproduced here for convenience: 
Equation (19) states that the pre-tax interest rate (that is, capital's  marginal product) is 
unaffected by changes in the proportional tax rate on income from investments in physical 
capital or consumption 10ans.~ 
This interest-rate neutrality result is even stronger than it appears. Since the deriva- 
tion of  equation (19) does not play off  of  the interconnectedness of  budget constraints, it 
does not require pervasive altruistic preferences. Provided there exist at least some family 
lines characterized by  (i) an operative altruistic transfer motive and (ii) young members 
who are at an interior solution with respect to their borrowing (or saving) decision, then 
equation (19) (or (181) holds at a steady-state equilibrium. Hence, this interest-rate neu- 
trality result is consistent with the following observations: some family lines behave as 
pure life-cycle consumers; a broad range of  motives contributes to observed patterns and 
magnitudes of  intergenerational transfers; and many persons are at a corner with respect 
to their borrowing and saving  decision^.^ 
We  make three other straightforward observations about this neutrality result. First, 
if  p < 6, then a similar argument establishes that equation (18) holds in the steady-state 
equilibrium, provided that at least some family lines have an operative altruistic transfer 
motive. Second, when conditions (i) and (ii) hold for at least some family lines, all lump 
sum interventions involving government expenditures and/or government debt also have 
zero effect on capital's  steady-state marginal product.  Finally, equation (4) implies that 
interest-rate neutrality is equivalent to aggregate-savings neutrality when the aggregate 
labor supply is inelastic. 
3~his  neutrality result requires, of  course, a restriction on the size of  the change in p.  For 
a decrease in p, the restriction is that the after-tax lending rate not be pushed to a point 
where condition (11) fails to hold with equality. For an increase in p, the restriction is that 
the young not be pushed to a corner with respect to their borrowing decision. 
4Thu~,  interest-rate neutrality is compatible with the existence of  borrowing-constrained 
consumers as in the economies analyzed by  Altig and Davis  (1989a,b) and with the accu- 
mulating empirical evidence on the importance of  borrowing constraints; see Zeldes (1989) 
and the references therein. We  summarize these results in 
Proposition  4:  If  borrowing  rates exceed  lending rates and at least some family lines 
are characterized  by  (a) positive intergenerational  transfers motivated  by  a  preference 
specification of the form (5) and (b) young persons who are at an interior solution with 
respect to their borrowing or saving decision, then (i) changes in the level of  government 
expenditures,  (ii) fiscal policies that redistribute resources between generations or over 
time in a lump-sum manner, and (iii) changes in the tax rate on interest income have 
no effect on capital's  marginal product.  Furthermore, if  the aggregate labor supply is 
inelastic, then these interventions have no effect on steady-state aggregate savings. 
We  are aware of  two previous analyses that use a line of  proof similar to the one 
underlying proposition 4.  In Altig and Davis (1989a) we  prove an interest-rate neutrality 
result in the context of  a model with borrowing constraints and child-to-parent altruistic 
gift motives. We  also discuss the role played by the separability assumptions embedded in 
the preference specification (5) in this line of  proof.  Summers (1982) derives an interest- 
rate neutrality result in an overlapping generations model with capital income taxation, 
but with no wedge between  borrowing and lending rates.  Summers stresses the infinite 
elasticity of  savings with respect to the after-tax rate of  return implied by the neutrality 
result in his setting. 
In sharp contrast, depending on the elasticity of  labor supply, we obtain a zero long- 
run elasticity  of savings with  respect  to the after-tax  rate of  return on savings.  The 
difference between our results and those of  Summers reflects the wedge between borrowing 
and lending rates in our framework as compared to the absence of a wedge in his framework. 
B. The Long-Run Eflect  of the Subsidy on Interest Payments 
In contrast to the neutrality of  capital's marginal product with respect to the propor- 
tional tax rate on capital income, capital's marginal product is highly sensitive to changes 
in the proportional subsidy rate on interest  payments.  This result, too, follows directly 
from equation (19). Thus, we  have 
Proposition 5: Under the hypotheses of  proposition 4, the steady-state marginal product 
of  capital, given by  equation  (19), is an increasing function of  the proportional subsidy 
rate applied to interest payments on consumption loans. Consider a simple numerical example in which n = .641 and P  = .778.  Interpreting a 
period as 25 years, these values correspond to an annual population growth rate of  2 percent 
and an annual time discount factor of  .99.  Assume that parents weight each child's utility 
one-half as heavily as their own utility. Now consider the impact of  a reduction in 6 from 
.25 to 0,  which corresponds to the estimated effect of  the 1986 tax reform in table 1. From 
equation (19), this reduction in the subsidy rate on interest payments implies a reduction in 
the steady-state value of r from 4.29 to 3.22.  In annualized terms, this change corresponds 
to a reduction in the pre-tax rate of  return on capital from 6.89  percent to 5.92  percent. 
Thus, the recent  tax policy change governing the proportional subsidy rate on  interest 
payments implies a 14 percent decline in the steady-state marginal product of  capital in 
this partial parameterization of  the altruistic linkage model. This sizable reduction in the 
marginal product of  capital implies that the elimination of  interest payment deductibility 
causes a sizable increase in the steady-state capital stock, even if  aggregate labor supply 
is inelastic in the long run. 
C. A Remark on the Existence of  Equilibrium 
We  close this section with a brief remark on the existence of  equilibrium.  All of  our 
novel fiscal policy results hypothesize an equilibrium in which some or all family lines are 
characterized by  both operative intergenerational transfers and young members who bor- 
row in the consumption-loans market. The reader may well ask whether such equilibrium 
configurations are likely outcomes in our overlapping generations framework.  Altig and 
Davis (1989b) address this issue at length in versions of  the framework with p = 6 = 0, 
inelastic labor supply, and homogeneous family lines.  Given reasonable and conventional 
specifications of preferences, the production technology, and the lifetime productivity pro- 
file, we show that it is quite easy to obtain equilibria with operative transfers and an active 
loan market for small values of  the interpersonal discount factor.  With allowance for het- 
erogeneous family lines, there is even more scope for equilibria that satisfy the hypotheses 
of our propositions. 
6. Tax Policy and Aggregate Savings: Experiments in Three Models 
With respect to the effects of  tax policy on aggregate savings, two basic points emerge from the analytical results in section 5.  First, in the altruistic linkage model, aggregate 
savings is considerably more sensitive to changes in the subsidy rate on interest payments 
(6) than to changes in the tax rate on interest income (p). Second, the aggregate savings 
response to changes in 6 or p  in the altruistic linkage model differs from the response in 
life-cycle and dynastic/representative agent models. 
Our objective here is to develop these points more fully by quantifying the long-run 
aggregate savings response to tax policy changes in the three models.  The three models 
we consider are the altruistic linkage (AL) model with operative transfers and differential 
borrowing and lending rates, the life-cycle (LC) model with no transfers but differential 
borrowing and lending rates, and the dynastic/representative agent (DRA) model.  Since 
the dynastic/representative agent model does not admit differential borrowing and lending 
rates, we assume that p = 6 in our simulations of  this model.5 Using each of  these models 
in turn, we  calculate the percentage change in the steady-state capital stock associated 
with permanent changes in the tax policy parameters. 
A. Parameterization 






p'  = .99, p = 
Interpersonal discount factor (altruistic linkage model): 
6Propositions 1 and 2 imply that Barro-type dynasties do not exist when borrowing and 
lending rates differ in an active consumption-loans market. Thus, the standard motivation 
for the infinitely lived representative-agent framework, as described by  Judd (1987) and 
elaborated by Aiyagari (1987), breaks down.  Nonetheless, we can still ask how the response 
to changes in the proportional tax rate on capital income in the representative agent model 
compare to responses in the life-cycle model and generalized altruistic linkage model. Period utility (over consumption): 
Period utility (over labor supply): 
A priori, the magnitude of  the aggregate savings response to changes in the tax policy 
parameters seems likely to be sensitive to the intertemporal substitution elasticities, ac 
and a~,  as the following remarks suggest.  First, it is well known that the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution in consumption strongly influences the savings response to changes 
in the after-tax interest rate in the LC and DRA models. Second, in models with altruistic 
linkages, Altig and Davis (1989b) show that small changes in the willingness to substitute 
consumption intertemporally have powerful effects on the magnitude of  intergenerational 
transfers and on the scale of  activity in the consumption-loans  market. Finally, the analysis 
in section 5 shows that, at least for the AL model, the aggregate savings response to changes 
in the marginal tax rate on interest income depends critically on the elasticity of  labor 
These observations prompt us to simulate the long-run response to tax policy inter- 
ventions under several sets of  values for the intertemporal substitution elasticities.  We 
consider values of  ON in the set {.I, .3,1) and values of  ac in the set j.33, .5,1). 
MaCurdy's  (1981) study of  men's  labor supply behavior suggests values of  ON  in 
the range (.I,  .45),  a finding largely confirmed in related studies (see Pencavel  [1986]). 
Our midpoint value of  a~ is  near  the midpoint of  MaCurdy's  range,  while our lower 
value corresponds to to the lower end of  his range.  Despite much greater disparity  in 
the estimates of  the labor supply elasticity of  women,  there is broad agreement among 
labor economists that the elasticity is higher for women than for men  (see Killingsworth 
and Heckman [1986]). Thus, evidence on the labor supply behavior of  women points to a 
larger value for the aggregate labor supply elasticity. In additio~i,  Hansen (1985) shows that 
indivisibilities in labor supply behavior can lead to an aggregate intertemporal substitution 
elasticity much larger than the elasticity of  individuals.  These considerations lead us to 
consider unit elasticity as an upper value for a~. Turning to the intertemporal elasticity of  substitution in consumption, Hall's  (1988) 
empirical study suggests a value of  ac near .I. Hall's  estimates of  ac (as well as most 
other estimates in the literature) are based on short-run consumption growth responses 
to anticipated movements in real returns on financial assets.  However, given  the three- 
period-lived agents in our analytical framework and our focus on the long-run response 
to tax policy changes, it is more appropriate to parameterize the model in terms of  the 
willingness to substitute consumption over broad epochs of  life.  We  are unaware of  formal 
econometric attempts to estimate this notion of  an intertemporal substitution elasticity, 
although descriptive work suggests that the elasticity is large.  For example, Carroll and 
Summers (1989) show that the shape of  the lifetime consumption profile differs greatly 
across educational and occupational groups, and that the shape of  group average con- 
sumption profiles closely mirrors the shape of  group average income profiles.  Aside from 
pointing to important departures from perfect capital markets, these patterns indicate that 
consumers exhibit considerable willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally over 
broad epochs of  life.  These factors lead us to consider a fairly broad range for ac as well. 
Other notable features of  our parameterization include a lifetime productivity profile 
with a sharp peak during the middle years of  life and an interpersonal discount factor in 
the AL model for which parents weight their children's utility 35  percent  as heavily as 
their own. 
All of our tax policy experiments maintain a  balanced budget for the government 
by  adjusting lump-sum taxes and subsidies.  In the AL  and LC  models, the generational 
incidence of  lump-sum taxes matters. For simplicity, we assume that all distortionary taxes 
are returned to the affected generation via lumpsum subsidies, and we treat distortionary 
subsidies analogously. 
We  report the results of  two types of  experiments. 
Experiment 1:  The subsidy rate, 6, is fixed and the marginal tax rate on interest 
income, p, is varied. 
Experiment 2:  p is fixed and 6 is varied. 
In our simulations, we measure the capital-stock response relative to a benchmark tax 
structure with 6  = 0 and p = 22. These values closely reflect the fully phased-in provisions of  the Tax Reform Act of  1986.'~' 
B. The Savings Response to Changes in the Tax Rate on Interest Income 
Tables 2 through 4 report the results of  our simulation experiments in the LC, AL, and 
DRA models, respectively. The table entries report the percentage change in the steady- 
state capital stock under experiments 1 and 2 relative to the benchmark specification of 
the tax policy parameters.  Column headings indicate the value of  p and/or 6 in the new 
equilibrium, while the leftmost columns describe the parameterization of  the consumption 
and labor supply elasticities. Note that we include the inelastic labor supply case as well. 
Table 2 shows that changes in the marginal tax rate on interest income have significant 
effects on the steady-state capital stock in the LC model.  For example, assuming ac = .33 
and a~ = .3,  an increase in p from .22  to .33 causes the capital stock to decline by 6.7 
percent.  Elimination of  interest income taxation causes the capital stock to rise by 12.6 
percent. Similar results hold for other parameterizations of  ac and aN.  Turning to Table 
4, equal increases or decreases in p and 6  have significant effects  on the steady-state capital 
stock in the DRA model.  Assuming ac =  .33 and a~ = .3, an increase in p from .22 to .33 
causes the capital stock to decline by 17 percent. Elimination of  interest income taxation 
(and interest  expense subsidies) causes the capital stock to rise by 36  percent.  Thus, 
simulations in  both the LC  and DRA  models indicate that long-run  aggregate savings 
shows significant sensitivity to the tax rate on interest income.  These results are similar 
to previous results in the literature; see Summers (1982). 
The simulated effect of  changes in p differ sharply for the AL model.  We  know from 
proposition 5 that changes in p have zero effect on the steady-state capital stock when the 
labor supply is  inelastic.  Table 3 reveals qualitatively similar responses when the labor 
'Interest  expense on pure consumption loans will no longer be deductible as of  1991. The 
effect of  eliminating deductions of  interest payments on nonmortgage consumer debt may 
be muted for many households by  the availability of  home-equity lines of  credit.  In fact, 
lending in the form of  home equity lines of  credit has expanded dramatically since 1986. 
The extent to which this type of  debt instrument will eventually substitute for traditional, 
non-tax-favored forms of  consumption loans is  not yet clear.  See  Canner and Luckett 
(1989). 
 h he benchmark value of  p is taken from Hausman and Poterba (1987), who estimate the 
marginal tax rate on interest income in 1988 to be  21.7  percent,  based on the NBER's 
TAXSIM model. TABLE 2 
Notes:  Each entry reports the percentage change in the steady state capital stock as a result of  altering one of 
the tax parameters p or 6.  At the initial steady state, p =  .22 and 6 = 0.  Column headings indicate the 
value of  the altered tax parameter in the new steady state. 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
a,  =  .33 
uC  = .5 
uC  = 1 
The Effects of  Tax Policy on the Steady State 
Capital Stock Life Cycle Model 
p=.33  p=.ll  p=O  6=11  6=.22 
Inelastic  -8.95  8.65  17.01  -9.53  -19.19 
UN  =  .15  -7.63  7.31  14.37  -9.55  -19.25 
UN = .3  -6.74  6.41  12.57  -9.65  -19.47 
ON  =  1  -4.46  4.17  8.11  -10.26  -20.06 
Inelastic  -9.16  8.89  17.54  -8.73  -17.77 
UN  =  .15  -8.41  8.14  16.04  -8.72  -17.74 
UN  =  .3  -7.85  7.58  14.93  -8.82  -17.94 
UN  =  1  -6.11  5.86  11.52  -9.58  -19.40 
Inelastic  -8.18  7.85  15.40  -6.38  -13.20 
UN  =  .15  -8.31  8.01  15.77  -6.60  -13.63 
UN  =  .3  -8.42  8.15  16.07  -6.79  -14.00 
UN  = 1  -8.67  8.51  16.90  -7.53  -15.43 TABLE 3U 
Notes: 
a:  See note to table 2.  Unless otherwise noted, calculations in this table are based on 7 = .35. 
b:  Savings by  the young are positive in the initial steady state for a,  = -33 and the benchmark  tax 
parameters when 7 = .35.  All entries corresponding to a, =  .33 assume 7 =  .25 except for the inelastic 
labor supply case, which assumes 7 = .15. 
c:  Savings by the young are positive in the initial steady state for uc = .5, inelastic labor supply and the 
benchmark tax parameters when 7 = .35.  All entries in this row assume 7 = .25. 
d:  The young are at a corner with respect to their saving/dissaving decision in the new steady state. 
e:  The transfer motive is inoperative in the initial steady state for a, = 1  and the benchmark tax parameters 
when 7 = .35.  All entries corresponding to a,  = 1 assume 7 = .52  except the inelastic labor supply 
case, which assumes 7 = .50. 
f: The transfer motive is inoperative in the new steady state. 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
uc = .33b 
uc = .5 
uc = le 
The Effects of  Tax  Policy on the Steady State Capital Stock 
Altruistic Linkage Model 
p=  .33  p= .ll  p=O  6 = 11  6  = .22 
Inelastic  0.00  0.00  0.00  -14.39  -28.20 
ON =  .15  -0.33  0.31  0.60  -13.50  -26.58 
ON = .3  -0.58  0.54  1.05  -12.98  -25.62 
UN = 1  -1.18  1.10  2.12  -11.96  -23.74 
Inelastic
C  0.00  0.00  0.00  -14.39  -28.20 
UN =  .15  -6.6gd  0.35  0.68  -13.79  -27.09 
UN = .3  -0.66  0.63  1.23  -13.36  -26.30 
UN = 1  -1.49  1.41  2.77  -12.32  -24.37 
Inelastic  0.00  6.281  13.721  -7.741  -14.471 
UN =  .15  -10.63~  3.031  10.42~  -10.911  -17.62 
ON =  .3  -0.79  5.911  13.671  -8.721  -15.78~ 
ON = 1  -2.08  7.481  15.781  -8.411  -16.245 TABLE 4a 
Notes: 
a:  Each entry reports the percentage change in the steady-state capital stock as a result of  simultaneously 
changing p and 6  by  the same amount. Unless otherwise noted, calculations are based on 7 =  .35. 
b:  See note b, table 3. 
c:  See note c, table 3. 
d:  The transfer motive is inoperative in the initial steady state for oc =  1 and the benchmark tax parameters 
when 7 =  .35  when 7 =  .52 as in table 2.  All entries corresponding to uc = 1 assume 7  =  .60 except 
the inelastic labor supply case, which assumes 7 = .50. 
e:  See note e, table 3. 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
uc = .33b 
uc = .5 
oc = ld 
The Effects of  Tax Policy on the Steady State Capital Stock 
Dynastic/Representative Agent Model 
p=  .33  p =  .ll  p=O 
Inelastic  -18.35  19.23  39.28 
ON =  .15  -17.52  18.20  37.03 
UN =  .3  -17.08  17.67  35.86 
UN =  1  -16.34  16.76  33.91 
Inelastic
C  -18.35  19.23  39.28 
UN =  .15  -17.91  18.69  38.09 
UN =  .3  -17.63  18.35  37.35 
ON = 1  -17.07  17.67  35.87 
Inelastic  -17.7ae  19.23  39.28 
ON =  .15  -18.40  19.30  39.44 
UN =  .3  -18.43  19.36  39.57 
ON = 1  -18.53  19.51  39.92 supply is elastic.  The effects of  changes in p in the AL  model are of roughly an order of 
magnitude smaller than in the LC  and DRA models. The only exceptions occur when the 
tax policy change either pushes the middle-aged to a corner with respect to their transfer 
decision or pushes the young to a corner with respect to their saving/borrowing decision. 
The contrast between the aggregate savings effects in the AL and DRA models is especially 
striking.  Assuming ac  = .33 and a~ = .3, elimination of  interest income taxation causes 
the steady-state capital stock to rise by a mere 1 percent in the AL  model, compared to 
the 36 percent rise in the DRA model. 
C. The Savings Response to Changes in the Subsidy Rate on Interest  Expense 
In the LC  model, changes in p and 6 have roughly symmetric effects on the steady- 
state capital stock.  For example, again focusing on ac = .33 and a~ = .3,  an increase in 
S from 0 to .ll causes the capital stock to fall by 9.7  percent.  An increase in 6  from 0 
to .22 causes the capital stock to fall by 19.5 percent. Thus, aggregate savings also shows 
significant sensitivity to the subsidy rate on interest expenses in the LC model. 
In the AL  model, the aggregate savings effects of  changes in 6 are even larger.  This 
result holds for all parameterizations we considered in tables 2 and 3,  Provided that an 
interior solution holds at the new steady state, the capital stock effects are considerably 
larger in the AL  model.  For example, when ac = .33 and a~ = .3, an increase in 6 from 
0 to .ll causes the capital stock to fall by 13 percent, and an increase in 6 from 0 to .22 
causes the capital stock to fall by  25.6  percent. 
In sum, the simulations  point  to  powerful long-run effects  of  the interest  subsidy 
on aggregate savings in the LC  and, especially,  AL  models.  With respect to the 1986 
Tax Reform Act's elimination of interest-expense deductibility (on consumer loans), the 
simulations support the view that this reform will lead to an eventual 10- to 25-percent 
increase in the capital stock. 
7.  Some  Extensions 
In  this section, we extend our previous results regarding the long-run neutrality of 
capital's  marginal product in the face of  various fiscal policy interventions.  We  briefly 
consider the implications of  distortionary labor income taxes and the distortionary effects 
of  inflation when the capital income tax base involves nominal variable's. A. Distortionary Labor Income  Tazes 
Provided that there exist at least some family lines characterized by  an operative 
altruistic transfer motive and young persons who choose an interior solution with respect 
to borrowing or saving, arbitrary labor income tax schedules have no effect on the steady- 
state marginal product of  capital.  Under these circumstances, equation ' (19) describes 
the marginal product of  capital when the after-tax borrowing rate exceeds the after-tax 
lending rate.  (Alternatively, if  the lending rate exceeds the borrowing rate or the young 
are net savers, then equation [IS] describes the marginal product of  capital.) 
As  before, this result follows directly by  combining the intertemporal consumption 
first-order condition for the young individuals with the transfer-motive  first-order condition 
for the middle-aged  individual^.^ Hence, the results stated in propositions 3 through 5 carry 
over without alterat  ion to economies with distort ionary labor income taxation.  In addition 
to the long-run neutrality results in these propositions, we add 
Proposition 6: Under the hypotheses of  proposition 4, the steady-state marginal product 
of  capital is invariant to arbitrary changes in the labor income tax schedule. 
B. Inflation and  Nominal  Taxation 
We  model inflation by introducing an exogenously determined unit of  account. This 
device enables us to capture the distortion arising from the interaction between inflation 
and the tax structure without explicitly modeling the inflationary mechanism. We continue 
to assume a proportional tax rate on interest income and a proportional subsidy rate on 
interest  payments.  In contrast to our previous analysis, however, we  assume that tax 
calculations are based on nominal interest rates.  Denote the rate of  inflation (the growth 
rate of  the unit of  account) from time t to t + 1, as %+I.  Approximating the nominal 
interest rate as the sum of  the real rate of  return to capital and the rate of  inflation, the 
first-order conditions (9) and (10) become 
'The  steady-state invariance of  capital's  marginal product with respect to the labor in- 
come tax schedule does not require separability between consumption and leisure in the 
utility function. This observation is easily verified by relaxing the intraperiod separability 
assumption embodied in equation (5) and retracing the derivation of  equations (18) and 
(19). Using equations (9')  and (10')  to argue along familiar lines, we  have 
Proposition  7:  Assume that interest  income taxes and interest  payment subsidies are 
calculated on nominal rates. Then (i) If after-tax borrowing rates exceed after-tax lending 
rates and conditions (a) and (b) of  proposition 4 hold for at least some family lines, the 
steady-state marginal product of  capital is given by 
(ii) If  after-tax lending rates exceed after-tax borrowing rates, and conditions (a) and (b) 
of  proposition 4 hold for at least some family lines, the steady-state marginal product of 
capital is given by 
Three interesting results follow directly from proposition 7.  First, for a fixed inflation 
rate, the neutrality results in propositions 3 through 6 extend to economies with nominal 
interest  income taxati~n.~  Second, the long-run sensitivity of  capital's  marginal product 
to the tax parameters, p or 6, is an increasing function of  the inflation rate.  To see this 
point when, for example, borrowing rates exceed lending rates, differentiate equation (21) 
to obtain 
Third, when borrowing rates exceed lending rates, the effect of  inflation on capital's 
steady-st  ate marginal product hinges crucially on the interest payment subsidy rate, 6, 
and is independent of  the interest income tax rate, p.  From equation  (21), 
91n an explicit monetary model, the government's budget constraint implies a relationship 
between the growth  rate of  the money supply and fiscal policy  instruments.  A higher 
level of  government debt, for example, would be associated with a higher inflation rate, 
if  the interest payments on government debt were financed by  money creation.  In this 
scenario, and under the assumptions of  proposition 8, changes in the steady-state level 
of  government debt would be associated with changes in the marginal product of  capital. 
Alternatively, if  interest  payments on the higher level of  government debt were financed 
by  an increase in labor income taxes, the steady-state marginal product of  capital would 
be  unaffected. Thus, the inflation effect  on capital's  marginal product is an increasing function of  the 
proportional subsidy rate on interest payments.  Furthermore, eliminating the subsidy to 
interest payments eliminates the effect of  inflation on capital's marginal product. 
The implication of  these observations for aggregate savings can be summarized as 
follows.  When borrowing rates exceed lending rates in the altruistic linkage model, the 
magnitude of  any inflation-induced decline in aggregate savings is much more sensitive to 
the subsidy rate on nominal interest payments than to the tax rate on nominal interest 
income. If the aggregate labor supply is inelastic, then the long-run response of  aggregate 
savings to inflation is independent of  the tax rate on nominal interest income. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
The results in this paper do not conform neatly to any of  the prominent positions in 
the vigorous debate over the aggregate savings effects of  fiscal policy.  On the one hand,  - 
we prove the invariance of  capital's steady-state marginal product to government debt and 
social security policies and to the labor income-tax schedule under weak conditions.  For 
reasonable parameterizations of  consumption and labor supply elasticities, the effects of 
these government intervent  ions on the steady-state capital stock are also small. 
Notably, our long-run invariance theorem does not rest upon an extensive network of 
interconnected budget constraints, either within family lines or across family lines.  Nor 
does it rest upon the assumed absence of  binding borrowing constraints or otherwise perfect 
capital markets.  Thus, our invariance theorem is immune to the most frequently invoked 
arguments against the Ricardian position. 
On the other hand, the scope of our invariance theorem is narrower than the Ricardian 
Equivalence Theorem in many respects. The invariance of  capital's steady-state marginal 
product (and the approximate invariance of  steady-state aggregate savings) in our altru- 
istic linkage model is consistent with important short-run effects of  lump-sum government 
debt and social security policies and with distortionary labor income taxation on capital's 
marginal product and aggregate savings.  Our invariance theorem is also fully consistent 
with the view that these fiscal policies have important long-run and short-run consequences 
for the distribution of consumption across age groups and among heterogeneous individuals 
within age cohorts. Furthermore, our analysis points to powerful long-run effects of  certain types of  tax 
policy  on  aggregate savings,  regardless of  whether  intergenerational  altruism plays an 
important  role.  For  example, our simulations suggest  that the elimination of  interest 
expense deductibility by the Tax Reform Act of  1986 will lead to an eventual 10- to 25- 
percent increase in aggregate savings. 
We  interpret the sharply asymmetric response of  aggregate savings to changes in the 
tax treatment of  interest income and interest payments in our altruistic linkage model as 
a caveat to the use of representative agent models for tax policy analysis.  While repre- 
sent  ative agent models offer useful insights about intertemporal substitution effects, they 
do not permit one to pose interesting questions about the effects of  unequal-size changes 
in the interest-income-tax rate and the interest-payment- subsidy rate.  As  the empirical 
evidence in table 1 and the theoretical results for the altruistic linkage model indicate, this 
restriction is a severe one. 
Most of our novel results follow from proposition 1, which describes the optimal timing 
of  altruistically motivated intergenerational transfers when borrowing rates exceed lending 
rates.  While we doubt that our simple altruistic linkage model-and the optimal timing 
proposition, in particular-completely characterizes real-world savings and transfer behav- 
ior, we are willing to entertain the hypothesis that the model captures an element of  truth 
for a significant fraction of  the population.  This hypothesis suggests two interesting and 
testable implications that we plan to pursue in future empirical work. 
The first testable implication follows directly from the optimal timing proposition and 
involves the connection between the age distribution of  resources and the age distribution 
of consumption.  (See Boskin and Kotlikoff [1985],  Abel and Kotlikoff  [1988], and Altonji, 
Hayashi, and Kotlikoff  [I9891 for  related empirical work.)  According to proposition 1, 
shocks that redistribute income between middle-aged and young persons imply no change 
in  the age distribution  of  consumption, whereas shocks that redistribute income from 
middle-aged (or young) persons to old persons lead to increased consumption by the old. 
This strict testable implication follows when all family lines exhibit nonstrategic altruistic 
behavior. More plausibly, in our view, when some family lines operate as pure life cyclers 
and other family lines operate as altruists, the testable implication becomes this:  a one- 
dollar redistribution of  resources from middle-aged individuals to old individuals leads to a larger decline in consumption by the middle-aged than would a one-dollar redistribution 
of income from the middle-aged individuals to young individuals. This implication can be 
tested with time-series data on age-consumption and age-income (or age-wealth) profiles. 
It can also be reformulated as holding on average (across families) in panel data. 
A second testable implication follows from propositions 4 and 5, which describe the 
long-run aggregate savings response to the tax treatment of  interest income and interest 
expense in the altruistic linkage model.  If  our analysis captures an important element of 
real-world behavior, then cross-country differences in the tax treatment of  consumer loan 
interest expenses will help to explain differences in aggregate savings rates. At a minimum, 
the subsidy rate on consumer loans will have more explanatory power than the tax rate 
on interest income. References 
Abel,  Andrew and Laurence  Kotlikoff, 1988,  "Does  the Consumption  of  Different  Age 
Groups Move Together?  A New  Nonparametric Test of  Intergenerational Altruism," 
NBER Working Paper No.  2490. 
Aiyagari, S.  R.,  1987, "Overlapping Generations and Infinitely Lived  Agents," Working 
Paper No.  328, Federal Reserve Bank of  Minneapolis. 
Altig  D.  and  Steve J. Davis,  1989a, "Government  Debt,  Redistributive Fiscal  Policy, 
and the Interaction Between Borrowing Constraints and Intergenerational Altruism," 
Journal of  Monetary Economics, 24, 3-29. 
, 198913, "Altruism, Borrowing Constraints, and Social Security," Discussion 
Paper No.  422, Graduate School of  Business, Indiana University. 
Altonji, Joseph, Fumio Hayashi, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, 1989, "Is the Extended Family 
Altruistically Linked?  Direct Tests Using Micro Data,"  Manuscript, Northwestern 
University. 
Barro R., 1974, "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?"  Journal of Political Economy, 82, 
1095-1117. 
Becker, Gary S., 1974, "A  Theory of  Social Interactions," Journal  of  Political  Economy, 
82, 1063-1093. 
Bernheim, B.D.  and Kyle Bagwell, 1988,  "Is Everything Neutral?"  Journal of  Political 
Economy, 96, no. 2, 308-338. 
Boskin, M. and L.  Kotlikoff, 1985, "Public Debt and United States Saving: A New Test of 
the Neutrality Hypothesis," Carnegie-Rochester  Conference Series on Public Policy, 
23, 55-86. 
Canner, G. and C. Luckett, 1989, "Home Equity Lending," Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 
issue. 
Carrol,  C.  and L.H.  Summers, 1989,  "Consumption  Growth  Parallels Income Growth: 
Some New  Evidence," paper presented to the NBER's  Economic Fluctuations Pro- 
gram Meeting, July. 
Cox, D.  and F. Raines, 1985, "Interfamily Transfers and Income Redistribution,"  in M. David and T. Smeeding, eds.,  Horizontal Equity,  Uncertainty, and  Economic  Well- 
being, University of  Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Estrella, Arturo and Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, 1983, "Average Marginal Tax Rates for U.S.  House- 
hold Interest and Dividend Income 1954-1980,"  NBER Working Paper No.  1201. 
Hall, Robert E., 1988, "Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption," Journal of  Political 
Economy, 96, no.  2, 339-357. 
Hansen,  Gary, 1985, "Indivisible Labor and the Business Cycle,"  Journal  of  Monetary 
Economics, 16, 304327. 
Hausman, J. and J. Poterba, 1987, "Household Behavior and the Tax Reform Act of 1986," 
Journal of  Economic  Perspectives, 1,  101-119. 
Judd, Kenneth, 1987,  "Debt and Distortionary  Taxation in  a Simple Perfect  Foresight 
Model," Journal of  Monetary Economics, 20, no. 1, 51-72. 
Killingsworth, M. and J. Heckman, 1986, "Female Labor Supply: A Survey," in 0.  Ashen- 
felter and R. Layard, eds., Handbook of  Labor  Economics, vol. 1,  North-Holland, New 
York. 
Kotlikoff, Laurence, 1988, "Intergenerational Transfers and Savings," Journal of  Economic 
Perspectives, 2, no.  2, 41-58. 
Kotlikoff, L.J. and L.H.  Summers, 1981, "The Role of  Intergenerational Transfers in Ag- 
gregate Capital Accumulation," Journal of  Political Economy, 89, no.  4, 706-732. 
Kurz, Mordecai, 1984, "Capital Accumulation and the Characteristics of  Private Inter- 
' 
generational Transfers,"  Economica, 51,  1-22. 
MaCurdy T., 1981, "An Empirical Model of  Labor Supply in a Life-Cycle Setting," Journal 
of Political  Economy, 89, 1059-1085. 
Modigliani, Franco, 1988, "The Role of  Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle Saving 
in the Accumulation of  Wealth,"  Journal of  Economic Perspectives,  2, no. 2, 15-40. 
Pencavel, J., 1986, "Labor Supply of  Men:  A Survey," in 0.  Ashenfelter and R. Layard, 
eds.,  Handbook of  Labor  Economics, vol. 1, North-Holland, New  York. 
Poterba, J. and L. Summers, 1987, "Finite Lifetimes and the Effects of Government Deficits 
on National Savings ," Journal of  Monetary Economics, 20, 369-371. 
Summers, L.,  1982, "Tax Policy, the Rate of  Return, and Savings," NBER Working Paper No. 995. 
Zeldes, Stephen, 1989, "Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical Investiga- 
tion," Journal of  Political  Economy, 97, no. 2, 305-346. 